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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
S. W. MORRISON, JR., Co-Administrator 
of the Estate of Fannie P. Morrison, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
W ALI(ER BANK & TRUST COMPANY, 
a corporation, Administrator with the 
'Vill Annexed of the Estate of Chauncey 
P. Overfield, also known as C. P. Over-
field, deceased, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE NO. 
9380 
Plaintiff appealed to this Court from the Order for 
Nonsuit, made and entered against him by the District 
Court of Salt Lake County on 1Iay 20, 1960 (R. 36), and, 
from the Order Denying 11otion For New Trial, made 
and entered by that Court on June 13, 1960, (R. 38). 
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The sole issue is whether or not the District Court 
erred in denying plaintiff an opportunity to further 
prove his case by the testimony of two witnesses. It 
ruled that these witnesses were prohibited from testifying 
by the provisions of Section 78-24-2 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, (Who may not be witnesses.) 
As appears from the pleadings, pretrial order and 
proffer of proof, which are part of the record, plaintiff's 
cause of action arose from a transaction during May of 
1941 when Fannie P. Morrison borrowed $3,500.00 from 
Chauncey P. Overfield and secured that loan with 16,136 
shares of stock which she then owned in the Independent 
Coal and Coke Company. The transaction was negotiated 
and consummated by the agents for the respectiv.e parties, 
namely, S. W. Morrison, Jr., agent for Fannie P. Morri-
son, and lone M. Overfield, agent for Chauncy P. Over-
field. A receipt or other paper evidencing the terms of 
the transaction and acknowledging the deposit of the 
stock certificates as collateral security for the loan was 
signed. This memorandum was not produced. However, 
it remained in the possession of S. W. Morrison Jr. for 
some time. Because of a fire in his horne and the result-
ing confusion, it was temporarily lost. No interest rate 
was entered thereon and the rne1norandum made no 
provision for foreclosing the pledged collateral and con-
tained no power of sale. 
The parties stipulated that the certificates of stock 
were never transferred into the name of Chauncey P. 
Overfield. Plaintiff's complaint is that, before the loan 
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beca1ne due, Chauncey P. Overfield, without the knowl-
edge, permission or consent of Fannie P. Morrison, and, 
in direct violation of the trust imposed upon him to hold 
the stock merely as collateral for the loan, fraudulently 
had the stock certificates transferred on the books of 
the coal company to the name of his wife, lone M. Over-
field, and their two daughters, which transfers he con-
cealed from Fannie P. Morrison and from plaintiff. 
By the terms of the loan Chauncey P. Overfield was 
to have applied the dividends on the stock to repay the 
loan and interest thereon. Regular quarterly dividends 
were paid on this stock far in excess of the loan and any 
interest thereon, but Chauncey P. Overfield failed to 
return the redeemed stock. This was in direct violation 
and a repudiation of his trust. 
At the time Chauncey P. Overfield violated and re-
pudiated his trust by converting the stock to his own use, 
thru having it transferred to his wife and daughters, 
it had a value of $16,395.00, and the dividends paid on 
the stock over and above the amount of the loan and any 
interest thereon amounted to $28,020.34, or a total of 
$44,415.34_ 
Fannie P. Morrison died intestate on November 27, 
1941. S. W. l\forrison Jr. is her son and also the co-
administrator of her estate and, as such, is the plaintiff 
herein. lone M. Overfield is the daughter of Fannie P. 
jlorrison and is the widow of Chauncey P. Overfield. 
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He died testate on July 14, 1958. Walker Bank & Trust 
Company, the defendant herein, is the administrator with 
the will annexed of his estate. lone M. Overfield repudi-
ated the provision made for her in her husband's will 
and elected to take the statutory interest in his real prop-
erty to which she was entitled as his surviving wife. 
Within the time for filing claims in the estate of 
Chauncey P. Overfield, plaintiff filed a claim against the 
estate for the sum of $44,415.34 aforesaid. The claim was 
denied and its denial gave rise to the suit for recovery 
in the District Court. Plaintiff asserts that Fannie P. 
Morrison never learned that Chauncey P. Overfield had 
violated and had repudiated the trust imposed upon him 
to hold her stock merely as collateral security for the 
$3,500.00 loan. Neither did the plaintiff learn these facts 
until just prior to the time he filed his claim against 
Overfield's estate. 
Evidence was adduced at the trial to show transfers 
of stock formerly in the name of Fannie P. Morrison 
directly to the wife and daughters of Chauncey P. Over-
field. Evidence was also adduced to show the dividends 
which had been paid on said stock. However, when 
plaintiff attempted to prove the other details of the 
transaction by the testimony of S. W. Morrison Jr. and 
that of lone M. Overfield, defendant objected citing Sec-
tion 78-24-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, (Who may not 
be witnesses) as his reason, and his ·objection was sus-
tained. A proffer of proof covering the testimony 'vhich 
these '\vitnesses "rould relate '\Vas made, at the conclusion 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of which, the objection was again made and again sus-
tained. Defendant then made a motion for a nonsuit 
on the grounds that there was no evidence to substantiate 
the allegations and claims of plaintiff. This motion the 
District Court granted. 
Thus, plaintiff was denied the fundamental right 
of using the testimony of his witnesses in the proof of 
his case, and therefore, has appealed to this 'Court for 
relief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Court erred in ruling that plaintiff's wit-
nesses were not competent to testify. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court erred in ruling that plaintiff's wit-
nesses were not competent to testify. 
Prior to analyzing what is suggested as the proper 
interpretation to be placed on Section 78-24-2 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 (Who may not be witnesses), which is 
the sole issue involved in this ap·peal, one should realize 
that plaintiff was endeavoring to obtain redress of a 
wrong which he asserts was committed by a faithless 
trustee who fraudulently converted to his own use cer-
tain stock belonging to plaintiff's mother which had been 
turned over to the said trustee solely for the purpose of 
securing a loan. In doing this, plaintiff was using his con-
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stitutional rights as set forth in Section 1 of Article 1 
of the Utah Constitution providing in part that "all men 
have the inherent and inalienable right to * * * acquire, 
possess and protect property" and the constitutional 
guaranty set forth in Section 11 of that same constitu-
tional Article providing as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause 
to which he is a party. 
The District Court of Salt Lake County was the 
tribunal in which he sought to obtain redress for the 
wrong done. By the court's ruling that the statute pro-
hibited his witnesses from testifying, he was effectually 
barred from having his case decided on its merits. The 
particular statutory provision invoked as a bar to the 
testimony of plaintiff's witnesses "\vas Section 78-24-2 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Who may not be "\Yitnesses), 
which states, in part, the follo,ving: 
The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
* * * ( 3) A party to any civil action, suit or pro-
ceeding, and any person directly interested in 
the event thereof, and any person from, through 
or under "\vhom such party or interested person 
derived his interest or title or any part thereof, 
when the adverse party in such action, suit or 
proceeding clailns or opposes, sues or defends, 
as guardian of an insane or incompetent person, 
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or as the executor or administrator, heir legatee 
or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian, 
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such 
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, 
or transaction with, such deceased, insane, or in-
competent person, or matter of fact whatever, 
which must have been equally within the knowl-
edge of both the witness and such insane, incompe-
tent or deceased person, unless such witness is 
called to testify thereto by such adverse party 
so claiming or opposing, suing or defending, in 
such action, suit or proceeding. 
The statutory provision quoted above specifies who 
cannot testify. It is antagonistic to the constitutional 
right that ''all courts shall be open" and that "all men 
have the inherent and inalienable right to * * * acquire, 
possess and protect property." It is destructive of certain 
of those fundamental rights granted by the basic statu-
tory provision set forth in Section 78-24-1 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 (Who may be witnesses), specifying 
who can testify. That Section provides in part as follows: 
All persons, witho1tt exception, otherwise than 
as specified in this chapter * * * may be witnesses. 
Neither parties nor other persons who have an 
interest in the event of an action or proceeding 
are excluded** *. (Emphasis supplied.) 
As directed by the broad Constitutional and statu-
tory provisions it would appear to be mandatory to re-
quire that the provisions of Section 78-24-1 be interpreted 
liberally to permit all persons to testify other than those 
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specifically excluded, and, to require that the provisions 
of Section 78-24-2 be interpreted strictly to exclude from 
testifying only those specifically designated to be ex-
cluded. This Court appears to have established that in-
terpretation when it said in the case of Sine v. Harper, 
118 Utah 415, 222 P2d 571: 
The question requiring an answer is, did the 
legislature intend to seal the mouths of agents 
when it used the words "or any person directly 
interested in the event thereof~" In view of the 
fact that the section limits the introduction of 
testimony which might be of value in determining 
the ultimate truth, we are incltned to narrowly 
construe the quoted phrase." (Emphasis supplied) 
As said by this Court in l\Iaxfield v. Sainsbury, 110 
Utah 280, 172 P2d 122: 
The purpose of the statute is to guard against 
the temptation to give false testimony in regard 
to a transaction with a deceased person by the 
surviving party, when the transaction is involved 
in a lawsuit and death has sealed the mouth of 
the other party. Furthermore, the statute seeks 
to put the two parties upon terms of equality 
in regard to giving evidence of the transaction. 
3 Jones Ev. 790; 1\tfiller v. Livingstone, 31 Utah 
415, 88 P. 338. It was never intended that this 
section should be used for the purpose of suppress-
ing the truth. (Emphasis supplied.) 
There are several con trolling reasons 'vhy this stat-
ute should not have been applied to prohibit plaintiff's 
witnesses from testifying. 
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First, it should be noted that plaintiff's witnesses 
were not the principals to the transaction. They were 
merely agents for those principals. 
In a very scholarly analysis of Utah's statute desig-
nating who may not be witnesses (78-24-2, supra), which 
appeared in an article in Vol. 13 of the Rocky Mountain 
Law Review, by the Honorable James H. Wolfe, former 
Chief Justice of this Court, he pointed out: 
Although the question has apparently not been 
decided in Utah, there seems to be nothing in the 
statute which prevents the agent of a surviving 
party from testifying to transactions with the 
deceased. Other states have uniformly held that a 
party's agent is not incompetent. 
Justice Wolfe then cited 21 A.L.R. 928. Subdivision II of 
that annotation provides in part at page 928: 
In many jurisdictions the statutes relating to 
the competency of witnesses where the other party 
to the transaction is dead, contain, among other 
provisions, a provision that in actions by or 
against executors or administrators, in which 
judgment may be rendered for or against them, 
neither "party" shall be allovved to testify against 
the other to any transaction with or statement 
by, the testator or intestate, unless called to testi-
fy thereto by the opposite party, or required to 
testify thereto by the court. Under such a stat~tte 
it is generally held that an agent of the sttrviving 
party is not incompetent to testify as to transac-
tions or communications with a person since de-
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ceased, in an action to which his prtncipal and the 
executor or administrator of the deceased are 
parties, but to which he is not made a party. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
Subdivision III of that same annotation then goes on to 
provide, in part, at page 931 : 
In some instances the statutes contain a pro-
vision that in an action or proceeding where the 
adverse party sues or defends as executor, or ad-
ministrator, or legal representative of any de-
ceased person, or as deriving right or title by, 
through, or from any deceased person, a "party 
in interest" shall not be permitted to testify in his 
own behalf as to any transaction had by him with, 
or as to any statement made to him by, the de-
ceased. In construing this provision it is generally 
held that an agent of the surviving party is not a 
party in interest within the meaning of the statute, 
and so is not incompetent to testify as to trans-
actions had with the deceased. (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
Again, at page 935: 
So, in each of the follo,,ing cases, in which it 
was held that a husband or wife acting as agent 
for the other spouse \vas competent to testify as 
to transactions had \Yith a person since deceased: 
Porter v. Dunn (1891) 61 Hun. 310, 16 N.Y. Supp. 
77, reversed on other grounds in (1892) 131 N.Y. 
314, 30 N.E. 122; \Vhit1nan v. Foley (1891) 125 
N.Y. 651, 26 N.E. 725, reversing (1889) 26 N.Y.S. 
R. 878, 7 N.Y. Supp. 310; Severcool v. Wilsey 
(1896) 5 App. Div. 562, 39 N.Y. Supp. 413. 
10 
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See also the supplemental annotation on this subject 
1n 54 A.L.R. 264 and the subsequent citations not yet 
annotated. 
S. W. Morrison Jr. is not a party to the suit as an 
individual. He is a party only in his representative capa-
city as co-administrator of the estate of Fannie P. Mor-
rison, deceased. His testimony would not concern itself 
"\vith conversations or transactions between himself either 
as co-administrator or as agent, and the decedent. It 
would concern itself with those matters negotiated and 
consummated by him as agent for his principal, Fannie 
P. Morrison, with lone M. Overfield as agent for her 
principal, Chauncey P. Overfield. 
Under the decisions referred to above these two 
agents should have been permitted to testify. 
Second, to be excluded as a witness, the statute pro-
vides specifically, that the witness must be ''a party 
to the action," or a "person directly interested in the 
event thereof," or a p·erson "from, through or under 
'vhom such party or interested person derived his inter-
est." 
lone M. Overfield is not a party to the action. She 
is not one from, through or under whom such party or 
interested person derived his interest. The only interest 
she cla.:.med in the Overfield estate was the interest she 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was entitled to in the estate by her own right as the sur-
viving wife of the decedent, Chauncey P. Overfield. She 
had rejected the provision made for her in his will and 
had elected to take the statutory interest to which she 
was entitled in and to his real property, by virtue of being 
his surviving wife. (R. 26) This ·Court has repeatedly 
held under such circumstances that the wife does not take 
as an "heir" but takes in her own right. See Staats v. 
Staats, 63 Utah 470, 226 P. 677. 
Even should it be assumed that lone M. Overfield 
was an "heir" of Chauncey P. Overfield before she re-
nounced the provisions of his will and elected to take in 
her own right, there is a serious question as to whether 
such an interest as that of an "heir" is an interest suffi-
ciently direct to make her incompetent as a witness. In 
the case of Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P. 2d 571, 
wherein this Court discussed that phase of the problem 
here involved: it was said: 
In the annotation in L.R.A. 1917 A 32, cases 
are cited holding that the interest in the action 
must be pecuniary, direct, immediate, and not un-
certain, contingent or remote, and that a husband 
is not incompetent because he may become a bene-
ficiary under his wife's 'vill or succeed to her prop-
erty by her intestacy. We held in Olson v. Scott, 
61 Utah 42, 210 P. 987, that the plaintiff's hus-
band \Yas entirely con1petent to testify as to state-
ments made by the plaintiff's deceased mother 
to the effect that certain bank deposits belonged to 
the plaintiff. l\fo\Yer v. l\fower, 64 Utah 260, 228 
P. 911, and the general rule on this point as stated 
12 
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in 58 Am. Jur. 195, Sec. 319, are in accord with 
this result. See also Clawson v. vVallace, 16 Utah 
300, 52 P. 9. 
Neither lone l\1:. Overifeld nor S. W. l\forrison Jr. 
were parties as individuals to this action. The interest in 
the transaction which lone 1\tf. Overfield may have had 
as an heir at one time which she rejected, and the interest 
which S. W. l\1orrison Jr. did have in the transaction as 
an "heir," were not interests sufficiently direct to make 
them incompetent as witnesses. And, as set forth above, 
since lone M. Overfield and S. W. ~Iorrison Jr. were 
agents, rather than principals, in the transaction, they 
should not have been declared incompetent as witnesses. 
Any relevant and material testimony which they could 
have given with respect to the transaction should have 
been admitted in evidence. 
Finally, to be rendered incompetent as a witness, it 
is specifically provided that "any statement by," ''trans-
action with" or "matter of fact whatever," a must have 
been equally within the knowledge of both the witness 
and such * * * deceased person * * *." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
In this case the loan was not negotiated by the prin-
cipals or either of them. It was negotiated entirely by 
13 
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and thru their respective agents. The authorization to 
proceed on behalf of Chauncey P. Overfield arose by 
means of telephone conversations between him, one of 
the principals, and, lone M. Overfield, his agent. (R. 28-
29) The shares of stock involved were secured from 
Walker Bank & Trust Company when an existing loan 
against this stock was paid by means of a check or 
checks aggregating $3,500.00 drawn on the Irving Trust 
Company of New York City given S. W. M·orrison Jr. by 
lone M. Overfield. These certificates were then delivered 
to lone l\1. Overfield by S. W. Morrison Jr. lone ~1. Over-
field then gave S. W. Morrison Jr. a written memor-
andum reciting the tenns of the loan being consummated 
and acknowledging the delivery of the certificates as col-
lateral security for the loan. None of the aforesaid con-
versations or acts took place in the presence of either 
principal to the transaction. While each principal was 
no doubt bound by the acts of his respective agent, it can-
not be said that the ''statements," "transactions" or 
"matters of fact" consummating said transaction were 
"equally within the knowledge" of the witnesses and the 
deceased. 
Unless they \vere "equally ":ithin the knowledge" of 
the witnesses and the deceased, Section 78-24-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, ( 'vho n1ay not be 'vitnesses), is not 
applicable and the "~itnesses should have been allowed 
to testify. 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
A careful analysis of the statute involved, the cir-
cumstances under which the loan was consummated, and, 
the pertinent court decisions interpreting similar statu-
tory provision, reveals that the District ·Court erred in 
ruling that S. W. Morrison Jr. and lone M. Overfield 
were not competent witnesses. The case should therefore 
be reversed and remanded for trial before the District 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
Suite 1020, Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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